Physical Automation and Artificial Growth 1 scenario
| Scenario | w(0) | w(T/2) | w(T) | w(T)/w(0) | Y(T)/Y(0) | Lab.Share(T) | ρP(T) |
|---|
Motivation
Kording & Marinescu (2025) show that when the physical and intelligence sectors are complements (ρ < 0), returns to intelligence capital plateau -- intelligence saturation. Their model assumes physical-sector labor is non-replaceable by capital: robots are too expensive and rigid to matter.
We relax this assumption. Robots are advancing rapidly. Their cost trajectories determine whether the physical sector remains a binding bottleneck. This extension parameterizes physical automation by making KP and ρP time-varying functions tied to different technology cost trajectories.
The Model
P = [αP · KPρP + (1-αP) · LPρP]1/ρP
I = [αI(1-ρI) · KIρI + (1-αI)(1-ρI) · LIρI]θI/ρI
Our extension: KP(t) and ρP(t) follow scenario-specific trajectories calibrated to historical technology analogs.
Scenarios
Key Finding
| Scenario | Saturation holds? | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| Baseline | Yes (by construction) | Permanent physical bottleneck |
| Persistent Scarcity | Strongly | KP growth too slow |
| Logistic Diffusion | With delay (15-20yr) | S-curve plateaus |
| Rapid Commoditization | Partially breaks | ρP weakens complementarity |
| Endogenous Learning | Breaks | Sustained exp. KP + high ρP |
| Directed Deployment | Depends on persistence | Policy surge may not sustain |
| Wright's Law (Endog.) | Breaks | Feedback loop: cost → adoption → cost |
| Directed R&D | Breaks with delay | Saturation redirects innovation to KP |
| Adachi Calibration | Breaks easily | σ=3.0 ⇒ robots substitute for labor |
References
Empirical Calibration Data
Robot cost data and deployment statistics used to calibrate the physical automation scenarios.
Industrial Robot Unit Cost (USD)
| Year | Avg. Cost | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2010 | $46,000 -- $55,000 | Deloitte / Statista |
| 2017 | $27,000 -- $45,000 | ARK Invest / Deloitte |
| 2024 | $21,350 | Industry data |
| 2025 (proj.) | <$11,000 | ARK Invest (Wright's Law) |
Humanoid Robot Cost Projections
| Robot | Price (2025) | Projected |
|---|---|---|
| Tesla Optimus | $40,000 -- $50,000 | <$20,000 at >1M units/yr |
| Unitree G1 | $21,600 -- $73,900 | ~5,000 shipped H1 2025 |
| Unitree H2 | from $29,900 | Pre-orders Apr 2026 |
| Agility Digit | $100,000 -- $250,000 | Industrial pilot |
Goldman Sachs TAM: $38B by 2035 (base), $154B (blue-sky). BofA: BOM $35K (2025) → $17K (2030), ~14% CAGR decline.
IFR Global Robot Installations (thousands/year)
| Year | Units | Year | Units |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 254K | 2021 | 517K |
| 2017 | 400K | 2022 | 553K (record) |
| 2019 | 373K | 2024 | 542K |
| 2020 | 384K | 2028 (proj.) | >700K |
Operational stock: 4.66 million units worldwide (2024). China: 295K installations (54% of global).
Robot Density (per 10,000 mfg. employees, 2023)
| Country | Density | Country | Density |
|---|---|---|---|
| South Korea | 1,012 | Japan | 419 |
| Singapore | 770 | United States | 295 |
| China | 470 | Global avg. | 162 |
| Germany | 429 |
Wright's Law Learning Rates (Calibration Benchmarks)
| Technology | Learning Rate | Total Decline | Period |
|---|---|---|---|
| Solar PV | ~20-23% | 99.9% | 1976-2024 ($106 → $0.10/W) |
| Li-ion batteries | ~18-20% | ~90% | 2010-2025 ($1,100 → $108/kWh) |
| Industrial robots | ~50% | ~82% | 1995-2024 ($120K → $21K) |
| Humanoid robots | ~40% (1yr) | early stage | 2022-2023 (GS est.) |
The critical insight: robots have a high learning rate (~50%) but very few cumulative doublings so far (~2-3). As humanoid production scales toward 1M units/year (BofA 2030 projection), doublings will accelerate. If the 50% rate holds, this maps directly onto the Endogenous Learning scenario.
Sources
Physical Automation and Artificial Growth
1. Introduction
The rapid advance of artificial intelligence has prompted a large literature on the future of labor (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019; Korinek and Suh, 2024). A key insight from Kording and Marinescu (2025) is that AI's impact on aggregate output is bounded by the physical sector. When physical goods and intelligence services are complements (ρ < 0), increasing AI capital yields diminishing returns -- intelligence saturation.
This result rests on the assumption that KP (physical capital accessible to production) is fixed or grows slowly, and that ρP (the elasticity of substitution between physical capital and labor) remains deeply negative. In other words, robots cannot meaningfully replace human labor in the physical sector.
We revisit this assumption. Industrial robot costs have fallen 82% since 1995 (ARK Invest, 2024). Humanoid robots entered serial production in 2024-2025 at price points declining ~40%/year (Goldman Sachs, 2024). Wright's Law -- the empirical regularity that costs fall by a constant percentage per doubling of cumulative production -- has held for robots with a ~50% learning rate. If this rate persists as production scales from thousands to millions of units per year, robot costs could follow the trajectory of solar photovoltaics, which fell 99.9% from 1976-2024.
We make three contributions. First, we extend the K&M model to allow time-varying (KP(t), ρP(t)) trajectories. Second, we calibrate six scenarios to historical and projected data from ARK Invest, the IFR, Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America. Third, we characterize the critical boundary in parameter space that separates persistent saturation from saturation-breaking growth.
2. Model
We adopt the nested CES framework of Kording and Marinescu (2025). Final output combines physical goods P and intelligence services I:
The physical sector uses capital KP and labor LP:
The intelligence sector uses AI capital KI and labor LI with Dixit-Stiglitz returns to scale θI:
Labor is allocated between sectors to equalize wages, with total labor supply L fixed. The equilibrium labor allocation β* = LP/L is found by Brent's method root-finding on the wage-equalization condition.
Our extension. We make KP and ρP functions of time: KP(t) follows a growth trajectory calibrated to technology cost data, and ρP(t) transitions from its initial value toward a scenario-specific endpoint reflecting changes in robot-labor substitutability.
2.1 Endogenous KP via Wright's Law
Our central extension endogenizes KP through a Wright's Law feedback loop. Unit robot cost follows a learning curve:
where Q(t) is cumulative robot production and b is the learning exponent. With b ≈ 1.0, the learning rate is ~50% per cumulative doubling, matching observed rates for industrial robots (ARK Invest, 2024). Effective physical capital KP is inversely proportional to cost: KP(t) = A · Q(t)b, calibrated so KP(0) = KP,0.
Robot adoption is endogenous. The flow of new production responds to the wage-to-robot-cost ratio relative to initial conditions, with a logistic saturation cap:
where η is the demand elasticity. This creates the central feedback loop: lower costs → more adoption → higher cumulative production → lower costs. The system is solved by forward Euler integration.
2.2 Directed R&D
Following Acemoglu (2002), we model the endogenous allocation of R&D between physical and intelligence automation. A fixed R&D budget R is split between the two sectors:
where s is the current intelligence saturation level and γ controls the sensitivity of reallocation. As intelligence saturates (s → 1), the marginal value of intelligence R&D falls, and the model endogenously redirects innovation toward physical automation. Physical capital then grows at rate:
This generates the novel prediction that intelligence saturation accelerates physical automation -- a self-correcting dynamic absent from models with exogenous technology trajectories.
2.3 Empirical Calibration of ρP
The elasticity of substitution between robots and labor -- σP = 1/(1-ρP) -- is a critical parameter. Adachi (2025) provides the first clean causal estimates using a "Japan Robot Shock" instrument, finding σP up to 3.0 for production and material-moving occupations. This implies ρP ≈ 0.67 -- dramatically higher than the K&M default of -0.67 (strong complements). At this calibration, robots are strong substitutes for labor in physical tasks, fundamentally changing the saturation dynamics.
3. Scenarios
We define nine trajectories spanning exogenous, endogenous, and empirically calibrated physical automation futures:
| # | Scenario | KP trajectory | ρP | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exogenous trajectories | ||||
| 1 | Baseline (K&M) | Fixed | -0.67 | No physical automation growth |
| 2 | Persistent Scarcity | +3%/yr | -0.67 | Surgical robots, bespoke arms |
| 3 | Logistic Diffusion | +7% → +2%/yr | -0.40 | 20th-century automobile analog |
| 4 | Rapid Commoditization | +15% → +1%/yr | -0.20 | Household appliance analog |
| 5 | Endogenous Learning | 2× / 3yr | +0.30 | Solar PV / Li-ion battery analog |
| 6 | Directed Deployment | +8%/yr + surge | -0.30 | China MIC2025 subsidies |
| Endogenous mechanisms | ||||
| 7 | Wright's Law | KP=A·Qb | +0.30 | Cost-adoption feedback loop |
| 8 | Directed R&D | dK/dt=ηRK | -0.20 | Acemoglu (2002) price effect |
| Empirical calibration | ||||
| 9 | Adachi Calibration | +7%/yr | +0.67 | Adachi (2025), σP=3.0 |
The first six scenarios use exogenous KP trajectories calibrated to historical analogs. The Wright's Law scenario endogenizes the cost-adoption feedback loop (Section 2.1). The Directed R&D scenario endogenizes the innovation allocation (Section 2.2). The Adachi Calibration applies empirical estimates of ρP from Adachi (2025) to test whether saturation holds under realistic substitution elasticities.
4. Results
4.1 Time Evolution
Figure 1 shows the evolution of key variables over 30 years under each scenario.
Under the Baseline and Persistent Scarcity scenarios, saturation reaches near 100% and wages remain flat. The Logistic Diffusion scenario delays but does not prevent saturation. In contrast, the Endogenous Learning scenario breaks saturation entirely: wages increase by an order of magnitude as both KP growth and rising ρP loosen the physical bottleneck.
The three new scenarios reveal additional dynamics. The Wright's Law scenario generates accelerating KP growth through the cost-adoption feedback loop: as robots become cheaper, adoption rises, cumulative production grows, and costs fall further. The Directed R&D scenario shows that intelligence saturation itself redirects innovation toward physical automation -- as the intelligence sector saturates, the marginal return to physical R&D rises, generating a self-correcting dynamic. Most strikingly, the Adachi Calibration (σP=3.0, ρP=0.67) breaks saturation even under moderate KP growth of 7%/yr, because high substitutability means robots can effectively replace labor at current cost levels.
5. Empirical Calibration
| Technology | Learning Rate | Total Cost Decline | Period |
|---|---|---|---|
| Solar PV | ~20-23% | 99.9% | 1976-2024 |
| Li-ion batteries | ~18-20% | ~90% | 2010-2025 |
| Industrial robots | ~50% | ~82% | 1995-2024 |
| Humanoid robots | ~40% (est.) | early stage | 2022-2025 |
The ~50% learning rate for industrial robots is high relative to other technologies, but only 2-3 cumulative production doublings have occurred. Bank of America projects that humanoid robot production could scale to 1M units/year by 2030, implying ~10 additional doublings within 15 years. At a 50% learning rate, this would reduce unit costs by ~99.9%, matching the solar PV trajectory. Our Endogenous Learning scenario is thus empirically grounded but represents the upper bound of plausible cost decline.
6. Discussion
Our results suggest that the intelligence saturation result of Kording and Marinescu (2025) is best understood as a conditional prediction: it holds if physical automation remains expensive and non-substitutable. Three lines of evidence challenge this condition.
First, the Wright's Law feedback loop (Section 2.1) generates accelerating cost decline as robot production scales. With a ~50% learning rate and cumulative production expected to grow from millions to tens of millions of units by 2035 (Goldman Sachs, 2024), the cost-adoption feedback creates explosive dynamics absent from exogenous-trajectory models.
Second, the Directed R&D mechanism (Section 2.2) provides a self-correcting dynamic: intelligence saturation itself redirects innovation toward physical automation. Following Acemoglu's (2002) price effect, when complementary inputs are scarce, R&D is directed toward improving those inputs. This means the very conditions that produce saturation also generate the economic incentive to break it.
Third, Adachi's (2025) empirical estimates of σP ≈ 3.0 for production occupations suggest that robots are already strong substitutes for labor in physical tasks. At these elasticities, even moderate KP growth breaks saturation -- a finding that challenges the K&M assumption of strong complementarity (ρP = -0.67).
Several caveats apply. Wright's Law learning rates can break down at scale due to materials constraints or regulatory barriers. The Adachi (2025) estimates apply to production occupations and may not generalize to all physical tasks. The Directed R&D mechanism assumes costless reallocation of researchers, while in practice retooling takes time.
For policymakers, the key levers are robot subsidies, labor regulations, and technology adoption rates -- these shape both the rate of physical capital accumulation and the degree of robot-labor substitutability, which together determine whether a country or sector faces persistent saturation or saturation-breaking growth.
References
Acemoglu, D. (2002). "Directed Technical Change." Review of Economic Studies 69(4): 781-809.
Acemoglu, D. (2024). "The Simple Macroeconomics of AI." NBER Working Paper 32487.
Acemoglu, D. and P. Restrepo (2019). "Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor." Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(2): 3-30.
Adachi, D. (2025). "Elasticity of Substitution between Robots and Workers: Theory and Evidence from Japanese Robot Price Data." Journal of Monetary Economics 152.
Aghion, P., B.F. Jones, and C.I. Jones (2019). "Artificial Intelligence and Economic Growth." In The Economics of Artificial Intelligence, NBER.
ARK Invest (2024). "Industrial Robot Cost Declines Should Trigger Tipping Points in Demand." ark-invest.com.
Bank of America (2025). "Humanoid Robots 101." institute.bankofamerica.com.
Goldman Sachs (2024). "Humanoid Robot: The AI Accelerant." goldmansachs.com.
Hemous, D. and M. Olsen (2022). "The Rise of the Machines: Automation, Horizontal Innovation, and Income Inequality." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 14(1): 179-223.
IFR (2025). "World Robotics 2025: Global Robot Demand Doubles Over 10 Years." ifr.org.
Korinek, A. and D.J. Suh (2024). "Scenarios for the Transition to AGI." NBER Working Paper 32255.
Kording, K. and I. Marinescu (2025). "(Artificial) Intelligence Saturation and the Future of Work." Brookings Working Paper.
Ma, R. (2025). "How Do Robot Subsidies Affect Aggregate Productivity and Firm Dispersion? Theory and Evidence from China." LSE Job Market Paper.
Trammell, P. and A. Korinek (2023). "Economic Growth under Transformative AI." NBER Working Paper 31815.
Wright, T.P. (1936). "Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes." Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences 3(4): 122-128.